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Foreword 
Achieving inclusive growth and productive employment creation is at the top of 
international and national agendas in both developing and developed countries today. A 
careful understanding of growth patterns and the evolution of the labour market based on a 
wide range of labour market indicators is critical for policymakers, workers’ and employers’ 
organizations in their continued efforts to promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all, Sustainable 
Development Goal No. 8 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.  
This paper, authored by Elisa Van Waeyenberge and Hannah Bargawi, examines the 
main trends in growth, employment, poverty and inequality in Uganda over the last decade, 
pointing to, inter alia, a lack of absorption of workers into high productivity sectors, with 
resulting implications for conditions of employment, poverty and inequality. The authors 
argue that the limited structural transformation is a result insufficient expansion in 
productive capacities by the private sector, against the backdrop of a historically weak public 
investment programme and a persistently lop-sided integration in international trade circuits. 
The authors also argue that the macroeconomic policy agenda has restricted the scope for a 
fundamental transformation of the Ugandan economy necessary to support much-needed job 
creation and increases in the standard of living. The authors point to a need for a pro-
employment macroeconomic framework in Uganda, including appropriate sectoral policies, 
accelerating public spending complemented by efforts to mobilise domestic revenues and a 
rethink of monetary policy beyond inflation-targeting. 
The paper was undertaken as part of a research project on “New forms of work and 
income security: global and country-specific perspectives,” funded by the Government of 
the Republic of Korea. With unemployment and underemployment levels remaining 
stubbornly high and insufficient job growth to reduce the incidence of working poverty in 
many parts of the world, against a backdrop of a rapidly changing world of work driven by 
new technologies, rapid shifts in the geography of production and trade, demographic change 
and other drivers, the project was undertaken with a view to building knowledge on the 
linkages between these areas. The support of the Government of Republic of Korea, and the 
ILO’s Research Department, in particular Uma Rani Amara, who coordinated the project, 
are gratefully acknowledged. 
 
 Sukti Dasgupta 
 Chief 
 Employment and Labour Market Policies Branch 
 Employment Policy Department 
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1. Introduction 
This Working Paper analyses government policies that have sought to foster growth 
and employment over the last decade in Uganda. It does so with a focus on the 
macroeconomy, itself the result of government policies as well as providing the context 
within which other government policies take effect. The current contribution follows a 
previous Working Paper (Van Waeyenberge and Bargawi 2010) which assesses the 
implications of macroeconomic policy for the creation of full employment and decent work 
for all in Uganda. Van Waeyenberge and Bargawi (2010) highlight how an opportunity to 
redefine the macroeconomic policy space in the wake of the Global Financial and Economic 
Crisis (GFC) failed to be captured by the Ugandan authorities, as macroeconomic policy 
remained driven by imperatives of stability and liberalisation. Such a policy stance entailed 
fiscal consolidation, high interest rates, flexible exchange rates and capital account openness, 
with significant implications for employment outcomes. Indeed, Van Waeyenberge and 
Bargawi (2010) demonstrate how insufficiencies of structural transformation and poor job 
prospects persisted, not in the least as reflected in the highly informalised nature of work.  
In this paper, we revisit the theme of how macro-financial policies condition the scope 
for structural transformation and the creation of employment (and more specifically decent 
work) in Uganda. Since 2010, the Ugandan government has launched a series of National 
Development Plans, the impacts of the global economic crisis continue to be felt, and, with 
a fast-expanding working age population, the need for “decent jobs for all” remains urgent. 
We draw on a broader appraisal of the realities of productive employment in Uganda that 
was commissioned by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) through an Employment 
Diagnostic Analysis (EDA) (Bargawi and Van Waeyenberge 2018). An EDA aims “to 
understand the nature of the deficiency of productive employment and to identify the 
constraints on and opportunities for enhancing inclusive job-rich growth” (International 
Labour Organization 2012: 1). One of its core features is that it seeks to be comprehensive 
through its attempt to understand various links and relationship across the economy bearing 
on productive employment outcomes.  
While drawing on the EDA, we focus here on one aspect of the Ugandan policy 
environment that was identified in the EDA as exercising a strong influence on employment 
outcomes. This relates to the way in which the macroeconomic policy agenda continues to 
exert a negative effect on the scope for the fundamental transformation of the Ugandan 
economy necessary to support much-needed job creation and increases in standard of living.  
We offer a core set of insights. First, despite progress in relation to poverty reduction 
and other aspects of human development, particularly during the 1990s and early 2000s, the 
creation of decent jobs for the rapidly expanding working-age population of Uganda remains 
dramatically insufficient. There is a lack of absorption of workers into high-productivity 
sectors. Instead, the low-productivity agricultural and services sectors continue to provide 
sources of employment for existing and new workers in Uganda. Furthermore, the majority 
of Ugandans are employed in the informal sector and many in household enterprises that 
share characteristics of underemployment, poor working conditions and low wages. Second, 
these labour market outcomes are strongly linked to the type of economic growth witnessed 
in Uganda over the past two decades. The insufficient structural transformation of the 
Ugandan economy has held back a sustained increase in gainful employment (and hence the 
demand for labour). Third, the Ugandan authorities are acutely aware of the need to tackle 
the employment challenge and have undertaken a range of initiatives, most recently through 
the second National Development Plan (NDP II) (Government of Uganda 2015), which 
recognise the urgent need for decent jobs.   
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However, despite important recognition of the problem, policy initiatives have suffered 
from two major draw-backs. The first is that policy initiatives to address the employment 
challenge have been piece-meal, ad-hoc, under-funded and poorly implemented. The second 
is the failure to root such policies within a wider framework that places structural 
transformation of the Ugandan economy at its core and engages with its real (rather than 
projected) constraints.  
Fundamentally, we argue that underlying these outcomes, there is a persistent (and 
long-standing) disjuncture between the ways in which the Ugandan government proposes to 
accelerate growth and create jobs, and the reality of how other developed and emerging 
economies have addressed these challenges, with little sign of this disjuncture being 
overcome. Specifically, across different government initiatives, a contradiction recurs 
between, on the one hand, the government’s celebration of the private sector as the most 
important agent to bring about growth and structural transformation, and, on the other hand, 
a failure to appreciate (and cater for) the specific needs of the private sector (beyond those 
of the financial sector). The policies that claim to support a shift towards higher productivity 
activities remain charted in terms of unleashing private sector entrepreneurial activity 
(across micro, small and medium enterprises), with insufficient acknowledgment of the 
intricate role the state needs to play for the private sector to develop along such a path, 
including through facilitating access to credit, protection of production for local markets, 
local content policies, specific trade policies, imposing performance criteria on strategic 
private sector players, etc.  
We argue that this essential shortcoming in government policy is related to a set of 
tensions within the Ugandan political-economy. This includes, first, the way in which short-
term macro–financial priorities have dominated longer-term imperatives of growth and 
structural transformation. This combines, second, with (and has been exacerbated by) the 
ad-hoc and fragmented nature of many policy initiatives targeting specific sectors. In terms 
of the labour market, the effects have implied the consolidation of a “regime of informality” 
(Breman and van der Linden 2014) in lieu of sustained improvements in employment 
outcomes.  
We proceed as follows. Section 2 documents main trends in growth, employment, 
poverty and inequality in Uganda over the last decade. This highlights the acute lack of 
absorption of workers in high productivity sectors with implications for conditions of 
employment, poverty and inequality. Section 3 unpacks the realities of structural 
transformation in the country. This reveals a highly fragmented and weak private sector 
accounting for insufficient expansion in productive capacity, against the backdrop of a 
historically weak public investment programme and a persistently lop-sided integration in 
international trade circuits. Section 4 provides an in-depth discussion of the persistent 
limitations imposed by restrictive macro-financial policy imperatives with negative 
implications for the scope to increase rapidly decent work and living standards in the 
Ugandan economy. Section 5 offer policy recommendations that emerge from the analysis 
and section 6 concludes. 
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2. Setting the scene: growth, employment, 
 poverty and inequality in Uganda  
 
While Uganda’s GDP growth has been relatively strong between the mid-1990s and 
the mid-2000s, growth has decelerated since 2006 (with the exception of 2011). Figure 2.1 
illustrates the fast deceleration of GDP growth rates from 2006 onwards. In per capita terms, 
growth slowed to average less than one per cent between 2012-2014. This compares to a per 
capita growth rate in excess of three per cent for most of the first half of the 2000s. 
Preliminary data for FY 2015/16 show that GDP expanded by 4.6 per cent in real terms, 
which is slightly lower than the five per cent growth rate recorded for 2014/15 (Bank of 
Uganda 2016: 36). This is below the target rate of at least seven per cent per annum 
recommended by the 2011 Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the 
Decade 2011–2020 (the so-called Istanbul Programme of Action (UNCTAD 2016: 2). 
Figure 2.1. GDP annual rates of growth; per capita GDP growth, 1995-2014 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.  
Compared to other East African Community (EAC) economies, the growth 
performance of Uganda has also been below par. Growth rates have been consistently below 
those of neighbouring East African economies since 2010, with the exception of 2011 
(see Figure 2.2).  
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Figure 2.2. GDP growth rates, 2000-2015 (Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania) 
 
Source: World Bank 2016 World Development Indicators 
Overall, growth of the Ugandan economy has been driven by the service sector. Figure 
2.3 shows how services grew steadily during the 1990s and early 2000s, but started to 
experience decelerating growth rates from 2006 onwards (again, with the exception of 2011). 
Figure 2.3. Annual % sub-sector growth rates, 1990-2014 
 
Source: World Bank 2016 World Development Indicators 
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For the economy as a whole, services produce the largest share of GDP since the turn 
of the millennium, accounting most recently for just under 50 per cent of domestic output 
(see Figure 2.4). The service sector is dominated (in terms of output share) by trade (13 per 
cent of GDP), followed by education (5.5 per cent), health and social work (4.5 per cent), 
real estate (4.5 per cent), ICT (3.5 per cent) and hospitality services (2.6 per cent). 
Agriculture’s share in GDP has steadily fallen over the years and now accounts for just below 
25 per cent of output in Uganda, with “food crops” accounting for half of that (at 12 per cent 
of GDP).1 The share of the manufacturing sector in GDP stood at just over eight per cent in 
2015 (UBOS 2016: 86). The construction sector, which is captured within the category of 
other industry, contributed to just over seven per cent of output in 2015. 
Figure 2.4. Sectoral distribution of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank 2016 World development Indicators 
Figure 2.5 indicates how employment is distributed across the main sectors of the 
Ugandan economy. These data are drawn from the 2016/17 Uganda National Household 
Survey (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2017), which proceeds along a new definition instituted 
by the ILO. Following the new definition, a person is counted as employed when this person 
(of working age) is engaged, during a short reference period, “in any activity to produce 
goods or services for pay or for profit” (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2014: 45).2 This implies 
that people for whom subsistence agriculture is their only activity are excluded from the data 
on employment (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2014: 46). 
Following this new classification, services employ the bulk of those in work at 47.7 per 
cent of total employment. The largest category within services, in terms of employment is 
____________ 
1 The other agricultural sub-sectors contributed to GDP (in 2015) in the following way: livestock 
accounts for 4.2 per cent of GDP, forestry for 4 per cent of GDP, fishing 1. 6 per cent of GDP, and 
“cash crops” (which include coffee, cotton, tea, cacao, tobacco, sugar cane and horticultural products) 
together account for 1.7 per cent of GDP (UBOS 2016). These cash crops, however, account for a 
large share of export earnings (see below). 
2 Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2014: 46) adds that: “’For pay or profit’ refers to work done as part of 
a transaction in exchange for remuneration payable in the form of wages or salaries for time worked 
or work done, or in the form of profits derived from the goods and services produced through market 
transactions, specified in the most recent international statistical standards concerning employment-
related income. (a) It includes remuneration in cash or in kind, whether actually received or not, and 
may also comprise additional components of cash or in-kind income. (b) The remuneration may be 
payable directly to the person performing the work or indirectly to a household or family member.” 
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wholesale/retail trade (at 28 per cent for women and 18 per cent for men). This is followed 
by transport and storage for men (10 per cent or men and 0 for women) and hotels and 
restaurant for women (seven per cent for women and just one per cent for men). Agriculture 
accounts for 36 per cent of total employment and manufacturing for 7.9 per cent. Both these 
sectors have relatively equal gender shares. Construction accounts for 4.6 per cent of total 
employment, yet female employment here is negligible and the figure for men is eight per 
cent of total employment. 
Figure 2.5. Employment by sub-sector and gender (%) in 2016/17 (new definition) 
 
 
 
Source: UBOS, UNHS 2016/17 
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A JoGGs exercise (see Bargawi and Van Waeyenberge 2018) confirms the lack of 
absorption of workers in high productivity sectors in the recent past. Instead, the low 
productivity agricultural and services trade sectors continue to provide a source of 
employment for existing and new workers in Uganda. The labour market participation rate 
in Uganda is around 72 per cent and is higher for men (81 per cent) than women (65 per 
cent) (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2017). Of the labour market participants, around 90 per 
cent are in employment (and rest counted as unemployed). Around 49 per cent of those in 
employment are waged workers, while 35 per cent are self-employment and the rest are 
counted as contributory family workers or employers. For waged workers, the vast majority 
(90 per cent) are employed in the private sector (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2017).  
A pervasive feature of the Ugandan labour market is its high level of informality, with 
formal employment making up less than 14 per cent of total employment (Uganda Bureau 
of Statistics 2017). Informal workers can be employed in both formal and informal 
enterprises but are characterised by the fact that they are not subject to national labour 
legislation, income taxation or social protection and are not able to access certain 
employment benefits (e.g. paid annual or sick leave, etc.) (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
2017).3 Uganda is not unique in being characterised by high rates of informal employment 
(Taylor and Rioux 2018), and it is often remarked that across industrialised as well as 
emerging economies, informal employment is on the rise (Breman and van der Linden 2014).  
In Uganda, surveys have only recently begun systematically to record information on 
informality. The 2009/10 UNHS survey, for example, found that 67 per cent of people 
employed outside the agricultural sector were employed informally (Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics 2011: 42). This is not comparable to the recent data which includes the agricultural 
sector and puts the national figure at around 86 per cent, with higher rates of informal 
employment for young people (95 per cent) (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2017). A 
consideration of sector-based production statistics is also illuminating. Informal 
manufacturing activities have risen from around a third of all manufacturing activities in the 
late 2000s to half of the entire manufacturing sector in the 2016/17 survey (Uganda Bureau 
of Statistics 2009; Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2016; Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2017).  
Rates of informal employment tend also to be higher for women than men, although a 
common “iceberg” view of the economy has resulted in much of the informal domestic and 
care work done by women not being systematically recorded (Kabeer 2008). This is also the 
case in Uganda where information on unpaid work is scant. Given the extent of the informal 
economy and informal employment in Uganda, it is useful to break down and differentiate 
between types of economic activities and the conditions of work across the informal 
economy. Figure 2.6 is adapted from Taylor and Rioux (2018) and Kabeer (2008) and moves 
from those at the bottom end of the informality pyramid (with the worst working conditions 
and pay) to those at the top where conditions and pay are similar to the formal economy. 
  
____________ 
3 Informal employment is defined “as comprising of the total number of informal jobs, whether carried 
out in formal sector enterprises, informal sector enterprises, or households, during a given reference 
period. Informal employment identifies persons who are in precarious employment situations 
irrespective of whether or not the entity for which they work is in the formal or informal sector. 
Persons in informal employment therefore consist of all those in the informal sector; employees in 
the formal sector; and persons working in private households who are not entitled to basic benefits 
such as pension/retirement fund, paid leave, medical benefits, deduction of income tax (PAYE) from 
wages and whose employment agreement is verbal” (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2011: 33). 
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Figure 2.6. The Informal Economy Pyramid 
 
Source: Adapted from Taylor and Rioux 2018 and Kabeer 2008 
Unpacking this picture further reveals an underlying gender division in paid and unpaid 
work in Uganda. A survey conducted by ActionAid (Budlender and Moussié 2013) found 
that Ugandan men spend, on average, three times as much time on paid work when compared 
to women. Women, on the other hand, spend at least three times as much time caring for 
children and housework as their male counterparts. The inequalities in paid and unpaid work 
between men and women may therefore be more pronounced than implied by the time-use 
components of the 2009/10 and 2012/13 UNHS which identify more modest differences in 
men and women’s time-use patterns. (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2011; Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics 2014). 
In addition to informality, underemployment and working poverty are pervasive 
features of the Ugandan labour market and labour under-utilisation is particularly acute in 
the agricultural economy (see Bargawi and Van Waeyenberge 2018). Dumas and Houdre 
(2016) present evidence of high degrees of involuntary part-time employment, with 26 per 
cent of those currently in part-time employment in Uganda seeking more hours of work to 
increase their income. These features have resulted in rates of working poverty that have 
increased in recent years. The proportion of those in employment but whose incomes fell 
below the national poverty line was roughly 13 per cent nationally in 2016/17, rising from 
seven per cent in 2012/13. This figure is significantly higher for those in rural areas and 
double the national average for Eastern and Northern regions. It is also higher for the self-
employed and those working in the agricultural sector (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2017).   
Finally, wages in Uganda have remained low by international standards and are lower 
than in Tanzania and Kenya (Gelb, Meyer et al. 2013). This may reflect the absence of a 
minimum wage in Uganda. Furthermore, national-level household survey data reveal that 
monthly wages have, on average, remained stagnant in real terms since 2005/06, with 
persistent gaps between wages in the public and private sectors and growing gaps between 
urban and rural wages and those received by men and women (see Bargawi and Van 
Waeyenberge 2018). Kasirye (2011) finds significant gender gaps in the private sector and 
for employees in the informal sector where women earn around 40 per cent less than male 
counterparts (see also Dumas and Houdré 2016: 13).  
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Uganda has however made progress in reducing poverty over the 1990s, 2000s and 
2010s and achieved the MDG target of halving the proportion living below the national 
poverty line ahead of the 2015 deadline. But in the past few years, poverty has been creeping 
up, in both rural and urban areas, putting into question Uganda’s ability to meet the SDG 1 
target of eradicating extreme poverty by 2030 (see figure 2.7). While the number of people 
living below the national poverty line had decreased from 9.8 million in 2002/03 to 6.7 
million in 2012/13 (Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development 2014), this 
has subsequently increased to 10 million between 2012/13 and 2016/17 (Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics 2017). Rural areas have historically had significantly higher poverty levels than 
urban areas, with poverty particularly acute in the Northern and Eastern parts of the country 
(World Bank 2016). 
Figure 2.7. Headcount poverty (national poverty line), by rural and urban (1992/93 — 2016/17, selected 
UNHS years) 
 
Source: UNHS Reports, UBOS (various) 
Over the 1990s and 2000s, reductions in overall poverty were achieved via decreases 
in both rural and urban poverty. However, since 2009/10, urban poverty reduction has 
increased to levels above those of the early 2000s, partially as a result of higher food and 
fuel costs (World Bank 2016). The recent sharp increase in poverty has particularly affected 
the Eastern region of Uganda and can be linked to the general growth slow-down as well as 
severe droughts and continued staple food price rises in the last two to three years (Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics 2017).  
Income inequality in Uganda has followed a different trajectory to that of poverty 
reduction (Oxfam 2016). The Gini coefficient increased over the 1990s to reach 0.43 in 
2002/03 and remained around 0.41-0.43 for most of the 2000s and 2010s. However, the most 
recent UNHS survey indicates a reduction in income inequality with the Gini at 0.37 for the 
country as a whole. This reduction appears to have been driven by reductions in inequality 
across some of the poorest regions in Uganda (Karamoja, Busoga and Eastern regions) while 
income inequality in Kampala went up (see table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1. Gini Coefficient by Region (2002/03 — 2016/17) 
 2002/03 2005/06 2009/10 2012/13 2016/17 
Kampala 0.47 0.39 0.43 0.35 0.39 
Central 1 0.44 0.42 0.46 0.40 0.38 
Central 2 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.36 0.32 
Busoga 0.38 0.36 0.33 0.37 0.31 
Eastern 0.35 0.35 0.31 0.33 0.29 
Mid-Northern 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.37 
Karamoja 0.44 0.40 0.51 0.43 0.33 
West Nile 0.28 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.29 
Mid-Western 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.35 
South-Western 0.36 0.35 0.40 0.34 0.36 
National 0.43 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.37 
Source: UBOS (2017) 
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3. Insufficiencies of structural transformation 
Structural transformation in terms of a change from an economy dominated by 
subsistence agriculture to an economy characterised by commercial agriculture and a 
sizeable manufacturing sector has insufficiently materialised in Uganda, see also (Kjær and 
Katusiimeh 2012) Yet, the country’s high population growth rate (at 3.3 per cent per year 
for the working age population), together with other challenges including those deriving 
from climate change, make structural transformation urgent.  
The main underlying reason for the insufficient structural transformation and the 
concomitant lack of expansion of productive employment in Uganda is the failure to develop 
and expand rapidly the productive capacity in sectors that can absorb the fast growing labour 
force in productive employment. This has combined with a failure to accelerate agricultural 
upgrading and reflects failures to raise the share of manufacturing value added in GDP, 
which remains persistently low at 8.5 per cent of GDP in 2015. This is below the (low) 
average for SSA (at 10.5 per cent for the period 2000 to 2014, down from 11.9 per cent 
during the 1990s) (Mijiyawa 2017).4 Haraguchi et al. (2017), however, remind us of the 
continuing crucial role of manufacturing in growth and development, including for low-
income countries.5  
While there are manifold drivers for the lack of structural transformation, we focus here 
on the combination of a fragmented and weak private sector with a historically insufficient 
public investment programme. The private sector has been designated through government 
policies as the main engine of development and growth but has failed to perform its assigned 
transformative role. These realities have interacted with a persistently narrow integration 
into the global circuits of global production and trade, as Uganda’s exports remain biased 
towards agro-commodities (despite a fall in their share of exports over the last decade, see 
below). We briefly discuss each of these issues and our assessment joins Brownbridge and 
Bwire (2016) who discuss the constraints on structural transformation in Uganda along 
similar lines.  
3.1 The state of the private sector in the Ugandan 
 economy 
Overall, the Ugandan economy is dominated by small (and mostly informal) 
enterprises. This can be illustrated on the basis of the Uganda’s Business Register for 
2001/02 and 2010/11. These indicate how the number of business in Uganda has proliferated 
over the period 2001/02 to 2010/11, from 161,000 to 458,000. At the same time, the average 
number of employees per firm has shrunk from 2.8 to 2.3. Compared to other countries, the 
Uganda’s firm structure stands out as particularly skewed. 
  
____________ 
4 See Mijiyawa (2017) and Haraguchi et al. (2017) for recent restatements of the strategic role of 
manufacturing in the development process. 
5 Haraguchi et al. (2017: 306) explicitly assert that: “country level observations lend … additional 
empirical support to the premise that manufacturing development has remained important for fast, 
sustained growth after 1990, and that this path has not been closed to even small or landlocked 
countries in recent year. China seems to have reached the peak in terms of output and employment in 
the cloth … industry. As the country upgrades its industrial structure and moves out of labor-intensive 
industries, space for industrialisation may open further for low-income countries if the right policies 
are implemented”. 
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Figure 3.1. Firms’ distribution by size, selection of countries 
 
Source: World Bank (World Bank 2017: Slide 66) 
This equally reflects in the skewed distribution of employment across size of firms 
when compared internationally. 
Figure 3.2. International comparison employment distribution across firm size 
 
Source: World Bank (2017: slide 67). 
Furthermore, the growth in businesses between 2001/2 and 2010/11 has been driven by 
entry of own-account workers and firm failure is high. Only 24 per cent of the firms 
established in 2001 (and recorded in the Census) were still operational after nine years. There 
are, however, significant variations across industries, with nearly half of manufacturing start-
ups surviving their first nine years as compared to only 22 per cent for new firms in the 
services sector (Kiranda, Walter et al. 2017: 51).  
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The activities in which new businesses have been established are predominantly in the 
trade sector, where the average number of employees is lowest at around 1.6 employees per 
business. This has remained largely unchanged since 2001/02. In contrast, the employment 
share of manufacturing sector businesses, roughly at 20 per cent in 2001/02, has been 
reduced to 13 per cent by 2010/11. This concurs with other findings regarding the Ugandan 
business landscape, which suggest that the establishment of new enterprises has been driven 
by negative push factors in sectors with relatively low barriers to entry, rather than in sectors 
with strong growth potential (Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development 
2014). This has led half of the country’s entrepreneurial activity to be classified as 
“necessity-driven” (Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development 2014: 15). 
This is the highest proportion for sub-Saharan Africa. For MOFPED, the Ugandan private 
sector landscape is characterised by the “missing middle”, as there are very few firms with 
several paid employees compared to a large number of small and micro enterprises with 
limited job creation and growth potential. Further, employment growth among larger firms 
has been extremely low.  
The government’s first National Development Plan (NDP I) demonstrated an acute 
awareness of the weak and fragmented state of the Ugandan private sector and conceded that 
the rapid growth in (small) enterprises, which are focused on low-value services, is “unlikely 
to be a platform for significantly transforming the economy” (Government of Uganda 2010: 
24). The 2015 Human Development Report for Uganda (UNDP 2015: 123) puts this as 
follows:  
Uganda’s private sector is dominated by informal micro, small and medium enterprises 
(MSMEs). Most of these operate as jua kaali (“hot sun”) enterprises with no formal business 
premises, no record-keeping, and limited access to bank credit. Roughly 65 per cent of these die 
before celebrating their fifth birthday. This implies one thing. The rhetoric of private-sector led 
development in Uganda hardly stands up to scrutiny. The fragilities in Uganda’s private sector 
present a strong case for strategic State guidance of wealth creation, job creation and economic 
transformation. 
The World Bank (World Bank 2013: xviii), also, emphasises that: 
Large firms can drive a rapid increase in employment because they drive transformative 
productivity growth and have significant potential to support a higher level of integration with 
regional and global economies. 
World Bank (2013) further highlights that while existing large firms in Uganda were 
downsized as a result of the privatisation programmes implemented during the 1990s and 
2000s, very few new large firms have been established since then (see also Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3. International comparison of entry and employment of medium and larger firms 
 
Source: World Bank (2017: slide 69). 
These observations raise the challenge of finding ways to support the growth of 
medium and larger firms (that employ more than 20 individuals) through strategic 
interventions. They also raise issues regarding the hazards of a development strategy that 
relies on the private sector, when the latter is weak, fragmented and, in general, unable to 
undertake the large-scale, long-term investments that the fast upgrading and up-scaling of 
the productive base of the Ugandan economy requires. It is indeed common that in the 
presence of widespread market failures (for instance, as a result of poor infrastructure), a 
weak private sector is more likely to seek rapid returns through activities like trade, finance 
and real estate, rather than invest in productive sectors that are essential for long-term 
development (Oqubay 2015: 95). Deploying a political economy-lens, Kjær and Katusiimeh 
(2012: 12) support the argument that Uganda’s capitalist class is weak and that the wealthiest 
have mainly derived their wealth from trade, imports, distribution or the service sector 
(mainly hotels and mobile phone services) rather than manufacturing. 
The general landscape of the weakness of the private sector reflects in a poor 
productivity record for the Ugandan economy, in particular when compared to regional 
peers. Figure 3.4 provides a regional comparison of trends in output per worker as a measure 
of labour productivity across the region over the last two decades and situates Uganda 
somewhere in the middle. However, despite progress in raising productivity since 1991, 
Uganda’s productivity growth has stagnated since 2011 (and going forward to 2020).6 This 
is particularly stark when compared to the trajectory of some of its neighbours. Rwanda and 
Ethiopia, for instance, with historically lower levels of output per worker, are rapidly 
catching up with Uganda, displaying steady productivity growth since the early 2000s.    
____________ 
6 See also Brownbridge and Bwire (2016: 8-10) for a discussion of changes in labour productivity in 
Uganda between 2002/3 and 2012/13. 
Large firm entry is relatively low
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Figure 3.4. Output per worker (GDP constant 2011 international $ in PPP) 
 
Source: ILO, KILM (2016) 
3.2 Insufficient productive capacity creation 
Underlying the trends of insufficient generation of productive employment are 
historically inadequate investment levels. Investment levels only increased moderately 
during the 2000s. They have increased more rapidly since 2009, but gross fixed capital 
formation as a share of GDP only briefly exceeded 26 per cent of GDP and has started falling 
since 2014 (see Figure 3.5).  
Figure 3.5. Total (and private) gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2017) 
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When compared to neighbouring countries and the SSAn average, real growth of 
capital formation in Uganda also performs particularly poorly. World Bank (World Bank 
2017: 19) documents that while in the period between 2012/13 and 2014/15 Uganda’s gross 
capital formation increased at an average rate of 1.7 per cent per annum this “was far lower 
than increases recorded by neighbouring countries, including Rwanda (8.3 per cent) and 
Tanzania (6.2 per cent) and less than half the average for sub-Saharan Africa (at 4.7 per 
annum)” (our emphasis). Further, Brownbridge and Bwire (2016: 15) highlight that most of 
the investment increase between 2009 and 2014 has been in residential and commercial 
buildings and oil exploration. Investment in residential buildings alone accounted for nearly 
40 per cent of private sector investment during this period (ibid). The authors add that: 
The large firms covered by the PSIS [private sector investment survey], which have probably 
accounted for most of the investment undertaken by formal sector firms outside of the oil sector, 
undertook investment equivalent to just over 3 per cent of GDP during 2011-2014. It is these 
firms which provide the bulk of high productivity jobs in the economy. They are not investing 
enough and, therefore, not expanding quickly enough, to absorb more than a miniscule share of 
the labour force. 
There are various reasons for inadequate investment levels. These include: inadequate 
infrastructure; high cost of credit; insufficient crowding in through public investment; and 
the traditional trap of low level of GDP generating weak aggregate demand prospects (see 
Bargawi and Van Waeyenberge 2018). This raises the urgent need for concerted, 
comprehensive and targeted efforts to increase investment levels in the country, both in the 
public and private sector (see below). While public investment as a share of GDP has 
increased since 2009, it currently hovers at around 7 per cent of GDP. This follows a steep 
decline in the early 2000s and remains far below levels attained in the late 1990s 
(see Figure 3.6). 
Figure 3.6. Development expenditures as share of GDP 
 
Source: IMF Article IV Consultations (various) 
Resources for investment are mobilised either domestically or through external 
resources. In terms of domestic resources, savings have been insufficient in Uganda. Figure 
3.7 indicates how these have stagnated since the mid-2000s and how they have remained 
beneath 20 per cent since 2010. 
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Figure 3.7. Gross Savings as share of GDP 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2017) 
In general, the 2016 UNCTAD Least Developed Countries Report (p. ii) recognizes the 
challenge of raising savings rates in a country like Uganda due to:  
the external resource gap facing the country, the complexity of its development challenge, its 
narrow tax base, the inadequacies in tax collection and administration, the resources forgone 
due to illicit financial flows and the insufficient development of the domestic financial sector. 
The Report adds that “[i]f LDCs are to raise their fixed investment, as is essential for 
structural transformation, the deficit will inevitably widen in the coming years, particularly 
in view of the enormous financing needs associated with the Sustainable Development 
Goals”. For Matovu (2010) weak private savings rates in Uganda are related to a set of 
structural features, including the practice of holding savings in non-financial assets making 
them less readily available for long-term and large-scale investments. This is compounded 
by a formal banking sector that is characterised by weak competition and high spreads (with 
low rewards for savers), see below.  
Weak domestic saving efforts have been accompanied by insufficient domestic 
resource mobilisation through the state. Figure 3.8 indicates how revenue mobilisation by 
the state has stagnated at very low levels below 14 per cent over the last decade.7 This 
compares unfavourably to revenue mobilisations in Tanzania, Kenya and Rwanda all of 
which are either close to or in excess of 20 per cent of GDP (Government of Uganda 2015: 
Table 5.10). The Ugandan state has also not taken recourse to more heterodox ways of 
mobilising forced savings, for instance through rent-appropriations generated by state 
ownership of strategic sectors in the economy.8  
  
____________ 
7 See (Kangave and Katusiimeh 2015) for an in-depth account of the various actors bearing on tax 
policy in Uganda. 
8 See (Clapham 2017) on rent-seeking in support of essential capital for infrastructural projects 
through state access to monopoly rents in telecommunications in Ethiopia. 
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Figure 3.8. Revenue mobilisation (tax and non-tax revenue) as share of GDP, 2000-2015 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2017) 
These weak revenue mobilisation efforts have been compounded by significant illicit 
outflows from Uganda. These have mainly been facilitated through trade mis-invoicing 
(particularly import-over-invoicing). Global Financial Integrity (2014) estimates that for the 
period 2002 to 2011, gross illicit capital outflows from the country amounted to an annual 
average of around seven  per cent of GDP.9 Global Financial Integrity (2014) finds that illicit 
outflows through import over-invoicing have been steadily increasing from $275 million in 
2002 to $1.75 billion in 2011. With a corporate tax rate in Uganda of 30 per cent, Global 
Financial Integrity (2014: 38) calculates that the average amount of annual lost tax revenue 
could be in the region of $243 million and for 2011 it could have reached $524 million, 
which for that year corresponded to around 77 per cent of the government deficit. Figure 3.9 
compares annual average ODA inflows to annual average illicit outflows and annual lost tax 
revenues to put these numbers in stark perspective.  
  
____________ 
9 Trade mis-invoicing through import over-invoicing is a common way to facilitate illicit capital 
outflows. Trade mis-invoicing refers to “the intentional misstating of the value, quantity, or 
composition of goods on customs declaration forms and invoices, usually for the purpose of evading 
taxes or laundering money” (Global Financial Integrity 2014:1). There are four basic categories of 
trade mis-invoicing: import under-invoicing, import over-invoicing, export under-invoicing, and 
export over-invoicing. Global Financial Integrity (2014: 38) explains how import over-invoicing has 
two broad appeals to corporations operating in developing countries. “First, it allows them to 
circumvent capital controls in order to keep valuable foreign exchange outside the country... Second, 
considering that over-inflated costs of imports result in lower profit margins, corporations can 
significantly lower their taxable income”. 
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Figure 3.9. Annual average ODA versus average illicit outflows versus average tax revenue loss, 2002-2010 
(in millions of U.S. dollars), Uganda 
 
Source: Global Financial Integrity (2014) 
In terms of access to external resources, the Ugandan economy has seen a stagnating 
flow of ODA (see Figure 3.10).  
Figure 3.10. Net official development assistance and official aid received by the Government of Uganda 
(constant 2013 US$ millions) 
 
Source: World Bank 2017 World Development Indicators 
This has reflected in a rapidly falling share of GDP over the last decade (see 
Figure 3.10), dropping from above 10 per cent of GDP in the early 2000s down to almost 
two per cent of GDP in 2015/16 (see Figure 3.11). 
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Figure 3.11. Aid as share of GDP 
 
Source: Bank of Uganda (2016) 
Mawejje and Munyambonera (2017: 2) observe that:  
The changing external development landscape implies that cheaper and patient concessional 
funds that can be invested in infrastructure are no longer readily available. Development 
financing from traditional donors, particularly grants, has significantly decreased. New partners 
such as China are willing to provide Uganda with the funds required for major infrastructure 
developments significantly beyond what the traditional partners have been willing to offer but 
at terms that are more commercial. 
Finally, FDI has followed a similar pattern. Following steady increases in FDI (as a per 
centage of GDP) over the early 2000s, FDI into Uganda has been negatively affected by the 
global economic crisis in 2008-2010. The recovery of FDI since 2010 has been weak, with 
the share of FDI in GDP in 2015 equal to that in 2004 (see Figure 3.12). 
Figure 3.12. Foreign direct investment, net inflows (per cent of GDP) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2017) 
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Considering the main sectoral recipients of FDI in Uganda, there has been a shift away 
from flows to the manufacturing and financial services sectors and towards the mining 
sector, particularly since the global financial crisis. This is reflected in FDI stocks by sector, 
as depicted in Figure 3.13. 
Figure 3.13. Foreign direct investment flows by sector (2005-2014) 
 
Source: Bank of Uganda (2016) 
Figure 3.14 indicates that, in 2014 almost two thirds of all FDI stocks (61 per cent) in 
Uganda were held in the mining and quarrying sector. This compares with a figure of around 
15 per cent in 2009. 
Figure 3.14. Foregin direct investment stocks by sector (2005-2014) 
 
Source: Bank of Uganda (2016) 
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3.3 Lopsided integration in global trade 
The lack of structural transformation and expansion of opportunities for productive 
employment is also strongly related to the nature of the integration of the economy in the 
world economy. Weeks (2004) observes how: 
(b)oth the rate of economic growth and its distribution across sectors and households are 
influenced by the integration of each country into the world market. Since economic growth and 
its distribution affect the growth and structure of employment, the quantity and quality of 
employment affect poverty, it follows that external factors influence poverty reduction to 
varying degrees in every country.  
Uganda has had disappointing growth rates in the volumes of its major export 
commodities over the 2000s. In the context of a heavy reliance on imports, this has implied 
a persistent gap between imports and exports (see Figure 3.15). 
Figure 3.15. Uganda’s current account balance – exports, imports and balance (1990-latest year) 
 
Source: Bank of Uganda, 2016 
There has however been growth in services exports over the past twenty years. As a 
share of total exports (in value terms), services have risen from below 20 per cent in 1995 to 
46 per cent in 2015 (World Bank 2017, WDI). Within the services sector, tourism (travel 
services) has historically dominated services exports (see Figure 3.16). Travel receipts have 
steadily increased from around one per cent of GDP in the early 1990s to just short of three 
per cent of GDP in 2015 (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2016). Visitor exports represent 26 
per cent of total exports in 2015(Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2016). However, since the early 
2000s, computer, communications and other services have also increased their share of 
services exports. 
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Figure 3.16. Evolution of and composition of Uganda’s services exports (1995-2015) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2017) 
Turning to merchandise exports, Uganda has witnessed some degree of diversification 
over time. Figure 3.17 indicates how the share of manufacturing exports in merchandise 
exports has increased in recent years. 
Figure 3.17. Evolution of composition of Uganda’s merchandise exports (1995-2015) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2017) 
However, while the share of primary commodities (food, fuel and agricultural raw 
materials exports) in merchandise exports for Uganda has dropped from over 90 per cent for 
the period pre-2000, to just under 70 per cent for 2015, the share continues to demonstrate 
the persistence of commodity dependence in the country’s merchandise exports (UNCTAD 
2016: 22) and over half of manufacturing exports are made up of cement and bovine and 
leather goods, hides or skins. Such a continued dependence on primary commodities exposes 
the economy to vulnerability in commodity price volatility and indicates the country’s failure 
to develop sufficiently export sectors that promote learning by doing and allow for increasing 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100% Travel services
Transport services
Insurance and financial
services
Computer,
communications and other
services
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Ores and metals exports
Manufactures exports
Fuel exports
Food exports
Agricultural raw materials
exports
 24 EMPLOYMENT Working Paper No. 244 
returns to be reaped (most notably in the manufacturing sector) (UNCTAD 2016: 20). 
Uganda has indeed suffered falling prices for its main agricultural exports, including coffee, 
cotton and tea. In 2015, coffee accounted for 15 per cent of merchandise exports,10 followed 
by fish at 4.4 per cent, base metals at 4.5 per cent, cement at three per cent, tobacco at 2.7 
per cent, tea at 2.6 per cent and cut flowers at 1.9 per cent of merchandise exports. 
There is therefore an urgent need “to increase the sophistication of the country’s export 
bundle, seeking to increase the value addition processes on locally sourced primary 
commodities”. For Hausmann et al. (2014: 20): “Uganda has taken some steps to diversify 
its exports … However, the bulk of this diversification has been into other peripheral primary 
products, particularly fresh fish. That being said, some non- traditional industries, such as 
cut flowers, plastics and metal products are also increasing their exports, albeit from a low 
base”. Such a finding is supported by (Shepherd 2016) who concludes that the recent trend 
for Uganda’s export sophistication is not promising, showing signs of instability compared 
with regional neighbours.11 He also finds few firms engaged in high-growth, high-
productivity agro-processing activities with Uganda still heavily reliant on resource-based 
exports. Furthermore, while regional trade between Uganda and neighbouring countries has 
remained stable over time, Uganda’s exports to neighbouring countries are dominated by 
agricultural products, predominantly food. Finally, severe supply constraints have affected 
major export commodities, where Uganda has failed to capture existing (and expanding) 
world markets (see Table 1 of (Republic of Uganda 2016)).  
____________ 
10 Note that Uganda is ranked as the 8th largest coffee exporter contributing to about 2 per cent of the 
world’s total coffee exports by volume. A large share of the coffee is exported to re-exporting 
countries. 
11 The measure of export sophistication used by Shepherd (2016) is the EXPY indicator developed by 
(2007) which captures the productivity level associated with a country’s export bundle. 
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4. Ugandan government policy in support of 
 gainful employment? 
The sections above have highlighted how the Ugandan economy has remained 
constrained by a fragmented structure of low-productivity activities and has failed to 
generate decent jobs for a fast-growing labour force. This reality has been exacerbated by a 
fast GDP growth deceleration over the last decade. It has also implied the persistence of 
widespread informalities characterising the world of work. Section 4 examines the way in 
which the Ugandan government has sought to address some of the challenges raised by the 
lack of structural transformation. It focuses, in particular, on the nature of the macro-
financial environment. It is our contention that efforts to promote (decent) employment 
creation have remained fundamentally hampered by the government’s preference for 
market-led private sector mechanisms to foster growth and transformation with insufficient 
attention to the pervasive and large-scale market failures that characterise the economy in 
Uganda.  
The section proceeds as follows. Section 4.1 describes the broad strategic direction that 
the Ugandan government has sought to project over the last decade and situates this (briefly) 
within the broader debates on catch-up development. Section 4.2 unpacks the way in which 
the macro-policy landscape has been defined. This draws attention to the role of the financial 
sector in the Ugandan economy, with particular implications for the macroeconomic 
environment within which resources for investment (and hence productive employment), 
including through credit extension, can be mobilised. 
4.1 From one National Development Plan to the other: 
 signalling intentions for change 
Over the last decade, the Government of Uganda has sought to orient policy towards 
job creation and the upscaling of productive capacity. This was emblematic in the adoption 
of the Uganda Vision 2040, approved by Cabinet in 2007. Vision 2040 has the overarching 
aim to transform Uganda from a “peasant and low income country to a competitive and upper 
middle income country within 30 years”. It signals a move away from the emphasis on social 
sectors and poverty reduction that had driven the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) 
process and which had lacked a sufficiently explicit concern for employment, growth and 
structural transformation.  
The National Development Plan I (NDPI) launched in 2010 was the first in a series of 
six development plans to implement Vision 2040. Apart from seeking to rebalance policy so 
as to incorporate longer-term issues related to productive capacity and employment, NDPI 
also sought to draw out and harness inter-sectoral linkages, functional relationships and 
synergies among economic sectors which had received insufficient attention in the past 
(Government of Uganda 2010: 6). A strong emphasis on infrastructure (power, road and rail) 
prevailed and job creation was a central theme of the NDPI (see Van Waeyenberge and 
Bargawi 2010). 
The second NDP (NDPII) (Government of Uganda 2015) takes the emphasis on job 
creation forward. It prioritises investment in five areas that it perceives to have the greatest 
multiplier effect on the economy. These include: agriculture, tourism, minerals/oil and gas, 
infrastructure and human capital development. These priority areas are accompanied by a 
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set of explicit employment targets across the main sectors of the economy (see Government 
of Uganda 2015 Table 5.13).12  
Like the NDPI, NDPII is committed to a "quasi-market” private sector-led approach to 
development. The private sector remains understood as the engine of growth to lead 
successfully in economic upgrading and increased value-capture processes of various kinds. 
The role of the government remains predominantly one of providing a “conducive policy, 
regulatory and institutional framework” (Government of Uganda 2010: 43). The NDP II puts 
this as follows (Government of Uganda 2015: 103):  
A quasi-market approach will be pursued in order to increase efficiency of the public sector and 
competitiveness of the private sector. With this approach Government will invest in key 
strategic infrastructure in order to remove the barriers of entry and increase private sector 
participation in the key growth areas. Government will create strategic partnerships with the 
private sector through PPPs [public private partnerships] for investment in infrastructure, human 
capital, minerals, oil and gas, tourism and agriculture.  
So, while government policy documents concede that during the 1990s and 2000s, 
policy may have been too heavily guided by a market-led approach to development, the new 
policy orientation through the NDPs seeks to pursue a “quasi-market approach” through 
“a mix of government investments in strategic areas and private sector market-driven 
actions”. 
Yet, the divergence of this new approach from the previous more market-
fundamentalist imperatives remains limited and is mainly reflective of broader shifts from 
Washington to post-Washington Consensus in development discourse.13 In the context of 
the National Agricultural Policy (Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries 
2013), this becomes: 
The Government of Uganda is pursuing a private sector-led and market-led oriented economy. 
In doing this, the government shall work on constraints that hinder the private sector from 
increasing investment in agriculture. Government shall support existing partnerships and form 
new partnerships with private sector actors. Government actions shall aim to strengthen the 
private sector through improved public service delivery and by putting in place an enhanced 
regulatory environment for the agricultural sector in Uganda.  
And, in the National Industrial Policy, we find the persistence of a “business friendly 
environment for private-sector led industrialisation”, with an explicit emphasis on “the need 
to minimise resistance to market signals in the course of resource allocation” (Ministry of 
Tourism Trade and Industry 2008: 7).  
It has, however, now become well-established in the literature on development that 
historical experiences of catch-up necessitate strong state leadership directing investment 
patterns in the private sector towards strategic sectors. Well-known studies of fast-growing 
“latecomer” economies have highlighted the broad-based nature of discretionary 
government intervention in support of accelerated growth through the use of manifold 
instruments including: trade tariffs, import substitution, export promotion, the extensive use 
of performance requirements on both domestic and foreign investment, credit extension by 
development banks, selective promotion of industries, and massive investment in skill 
creation, infrastructure and support to institutions (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Amsden 
____________ 
12 In the context of agriculture, the emphasis is on increasing production and productivity along the 
value chain and using agro-processing as a launch pad for industrialisation (Government of Uganda 
2015: xvii). For the minerals, oil and gas sector, the NDPII equally seeks to highlight the need to add 
value to raw materials through beneficiation and investment in an oil and gas refinery and milling (of 
iron ore into steel). 
13 See (Van Waeyenberge 2006) for a critique.  
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2004; Chang 2004; Lall 2005; Schwartz 2010). In the context of the LDCs, UNCTAD 
(UNCTAD 2006: 291) draws attention to the importance of a twin strategy of investing in 
dynamically growing sectors while at the same time building capacity in sectors where the 
majority of labour is employed and of deepening linkages between the latter and former 
sectors. This further needs to combine with a set of macroeconomic policies in the service 
of structural transformation and growth. This implies that macroeconomic and financial 
sector policy tools are not driven predominantly by stabilisation objectives and, instead, are 
oriented towards maximising domestic resource mobilisation in support of productive 
capacity expansion and upgrading.14  
In the case of Uganda, however, the policies that seek to support a shift towards higher 
productivity activities remain charted in terms of unleashing private sector entrepreneurial 
activity across scales (micro, small and medium enterprises), without sufficient appreciation 
of the intricate role the state is to play for the private sector to develop along such a path, 
including through facilitating access to credit, the imposition of performance criteria in 
strategic sectors, protection of production for local markets, local content policies, specific 
trade policies, etc. Policy-making in Uganda has been heavily steered by market-conforming 
imperatives. It is governed by an understanding of the role of government as predominantly 
regulatory, rather than seeing the state as a strategic actor in shaping the development path 
of the country through the deployment of a host of “unorthodox” tools that can accelerate 
development. Such an approach, however, remains fundamentally constrained in its ability 
to increase manufacturing value added as a share of GDP. 
We argue that there is a persistent (and long-standing) disjuncture between the 
government’s policy proposals to accelerate growth and create jobs and the actual, historical, 
experience of capitalist development, with little sign of this disjuncture being overcome. 
Indeed, across different government initiatives, a contradiction recurs between, on the one 
hand, the government’s celebration of the private sector as the most important agent to bring 
about growth and structural transformation, and, on the other hand, a failure to understand 
(or cater for) the specific needs of the private sector. The latter feature reflects a failure to 
appreciate the Ugandan reality of its very weak and fragmented domestic private sector 
(characterised mainly by its small-scale and low productivity, see Section 3 above). Such a 
weak and fragmented private sector is unable to lead on the necessary investments to expand 
the productive base of the country.  
It is our contention that this contradiction in government policy is related to a set of 
tensions within the Ugandan political economy. This includes, first, the way in which 
macroeconomic short-term stabilisation priorities have dominated longer-term imperatives 
of growth and structural transformation, which is itself related to the role of the financial 
sector and the particular relationship of the country with the International Financial 
Institutions. This combines, second, with, and has been exacerbated by, the ad-hoc and 
fragmented nature of policy initiatives targeting specific sectors. We focus here on the 
former issue, while the latter is further explored in Bargawi and Van Waeyenberge (2018). 
The rest of this section discusses how the Ugandan economy remains fundamentally 
constrained by an orthodox macro-financial policy framework. This is much in contrast, for 
instance, with the recent policy record in Ethiopia, where an impressive growth acceleration 
has been underpinned by an economic strategy that emphasises public infrastructure 
____________ 
14 Oqubay (2015) reminds us that while state interventions to improve agricultural productivity were 
largely ignored by various sub-Saharan African governments and industrial policies abandoned, 
domestic financial sectors were opened to foreign banks and capital accounts liberalised. This has 
undermined the capacity of the state to mobilise resources in favour of accelerated development and 
raises particularly pertinent issues for the Ugandan context (see below). 
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investment and that has been supported by a set of heterodox macro-financial and domestic 
resource mobilisation policies (Moller and Wacker 2017). 
4.2 The financial sector and macroeconomic policy: 
 persistent constraints on ambitious Development 
 Plans.   
As highlighted above, the success of a country’s development strategy and its creation 
of gainful employment depend on a country’s capacity to mobilise resources and allocate 
these strategically in line with core investment priorities that assist in upscaling the 
productive base of a country. An important determinant of the success of a strategy to 
increase the domestic investment rate and direct it towards sectors liable to create gainful 
employment is the macroeconomic policy framework adopted by a country. Particular fiscal 
and monetary policy stances determine the scope for public interventions, including through 
public investments and direct ownership of productive enterprises, as well as affect private 
investment through the cost and quantity of credit available to the private sector, the level of 
aggregate demand in the economy, etc. Fiscal and monetary policies further interact with 
exchange rate, capital account policies as well as the organisation of the financial sector. 
Together these produce particular macro- economic outcomes and investment patterns 
across sectors (as for instance skewed towards real estate to the detriment of manufacturing 
or agriculture), with important consequences for the creation of gainful employment. In most 
general terms, the scope for increasing the domestic investment rate and its concomitant 
effect on the demand for labour depends on underlying interests acting both through the state 
and the market, the role of finance in the economy, as well as the nature of the integration 
of the economy globally.  
Taking the issue of finance forward, the study of development has traditionally had an 
interest in its role “in supporting structural transformation of an economy, from dominance 
of low productivity to high productivity sectors, with accompanying shifts in employment, 
the transformation of agriculture and the development of industry and trade”(McKinley and 
Tyson 2014: 3). This often proceeded on the basis of a state-dominated financial sector 
enabling the allocation of resources strategically across the economy through directed credit, 
subsidised access to finance, etc. With time, this preoccupation with a strategic role for 
finance has become displaced by an imperative of financial sector liberalisation and capital 
account openness in favour of international financial integration. Nkurunziza et al.(2012: 11) 
comment how “[t]he liberalization of the financial system was meant to correct market 
distortions and create a level playing field, improve resource mobilization and achieve 
efficient allocation of resources across sectors”.15 Further, growing financial integration 
internationally would allow the capital stock in developing countries to increase by making 
foreign savings available.  
In Uganda, the financial system has been fully liberalised since the 1990s. Financial 
liberalisation has proceeded both through the deregulation of the domestic financial sector 
and its opening to foreign investment. In July 1994, the interest rate was fully liberalised. 
This was followed by capital account deregulation in July 1997. These measures were part 
____________ 
15 The underlying idea refers back to the McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) seminal contributions 
that argued (simplistically) that an expansion of the real money stock (as a result of interest rate 
deregulation) will lead to investment and thus growth. In a simple restatement of Say’s Law, now in 
the context of finance, higher interest rates resulting from financial liberalisation would stimulate 
saving deposits and these would in turn enable investment outlays. See Bonizzi (2016) for an 
overview of the manifold critiques of this theoretical proposition and an account of the way in which 
the literature on financial development has been “refined and enriched” over the last few decades.  
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of the World Bank/IMF-sponsored Structural Adjustment and Stabilisation Programmes.16 
The idea was that financial deregulation would enhance competition in the financial sector 
and increase the range of financial instruments available to facilitate investment in 
productive capacity (see Nyorekwa and Odhiambo 2014). The operation of market forces in 
the financial sector would improve the processes of financial intermediation, mobilisation 
and allocation of resources to produce accelerated investment rates in productive sectors (see 
World Bank (2017: ix)for a recent restatement of these arguments). Bategeka and Okumu 
(2010: 9) sum up: “the financial sector reforms Uganda implemented were aimed at 
achieving efficiency in financial intermediation on the one hand and strengthening the 
banking sector through efficient and effective supervision by the central bank study on the 
other”.  
A number of important bank failures, however, ensued, following the liberalisation of 
the financial sector (see Nyorekwa and Odhiambo 2014)). For many, these were ascribed to 
the inappropriate sequence of financial sector liberalisation in the absence of the necessary 
regulatory reform (see Abuka and Egesa 2010).17 In response, a moratorium was put on the 
licensing of new banks between 1999 and 2007. The moratorium was lifted in 2007 and 
today the Ugandan financial sector exists of 25 banks and a set of non-bank institutions (see 
World Bank 2017: 26).  
A few comments regarding the nature of the financial sector and its implications for 
credit allocation within the Ugandan economy are in order. First, the three largest banks 
(Stanbic bank, Standard Chartered bank and Crane bank) in Uganda account for 38.8 per 
cent of total bank assets (in June 2016). This is down from 49.71 in June 2012 (Bank of 
Uganda 2016).18 And, while the concentration of the banking sector has decreased, its 
alleged effect in terms of increasing the extension of credit has failed to materialise.19 Figure 
4.1 illustrates how the extension of credit to the private sector by banks (as a share of GDP) 
in Uganda remains very low and has stagnated over most of the last decade: the ratio of 
domestic credit to the private sector banks as a share of GDP has remained below 15 per 
cent and far below the average for sub-Saharan Africa.  
  
____________ 
16 See Stein (Stein 2010: 266-68) for details of the financial liberalisation programme in Uganda 
which started with the 1993 World Bank/IDA Financial Sector Adjustment Credit. 
17 This represents a general shift in World Bank-arguments of the 1990s towards an emphasis on the 
need for adequate sequencing and regulation in liberalisation efforts, including of the financial sector, 
in line with the post-Washington Consensus (see Bonizzi 2016 for a review).  
18 These same institutions accounted for 37.7 per cent of total lending in 2016. 
19 This is an important observation given that during various interviews we often incurred the 
proposition that increased competition in the banking sector would improve the conditions of credit 
extension in Uganda. 
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Figure 4.1. Domestic credit to private sector by banks (per cent of GDP), Uganda and SSA (2000-2016) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2017) 
Second, apart from a low rate of credit extension by banks to the private sector, such 
credit comes at a high cost. Figure 4.2 illustrates interest rates in Uganda. It documents how 
lending rates remain persistently in excess of 20 per cent (while deposit rates fluctuate 
around three per cent). And despite the Central Bank Rate (CBR) having fallen most recently 
(June 2017) to 10 per cent,20 the (shilling) lending rate charged by commercial banks remains 
above 20 per cent (Bank of Uganda 2017: 10).21 
Figure 4.2. Interest rates in Uganda 
 
Source: UBOS, various 
____________ 
20 https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/media/statements/archive/CBR-of-August-2017.html 
21 See Montiel(2013)on how the structural features of Uganda’s banking sector (its lack of 
competitiveness, its small size, its ownership structure, etc.) weaken the monetary transmission 
mechanism that policy rate (CBR) manipulations in support of inflation targeting rely on, see also 
below. 
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Interviews and participatory workshops conducted for the EDA repeatedly highlighted 
the limited access to and high cost of credit as a very important constraint on economic 
activity in Uganda (see Bargawi and Van Waeyenberge 2018). World Bank (World Bank 
2017: 33) refers to a number of business surveys that have identified credit conditions as the 
most significant constraint experienced by the business sector.22 It indicates that the share of 
firms with a bank loan (or credit line) is less than 10 per cent (compared to an average of 
just under 25 per cent for SSA). The share of investments by firms that are financed by banks 
only amounts to just over three per cent (compared to 10 per cent for SSA), while the share 
of working capital financed by banks amounts to 7 per cent (compared to 10 per cent for 
SSA) (World Bank 2017: Table 5) .  
Third, credit allocations across the various sectors do not reflect the priorities for 
investment and employment creation bearing on the Ugandan economy. Despite marginal 
increases in lending to the manufacturing sector between 2008 and 2015 this still represents 
just 15 per cent of total private sector lending (having increased from 13.2 per cent in 2008). 
Similarly, agriculture’s share has increased from 6.9 per cent in 2008 to 9.8 per cent in 2015. 
However, the trade and the building, mortgage, construction and real estate sectors together 
with loans to the household sector lead in the distribution of credit to the detriment of lending 
for agriculture and manufacturing (see Figure 4.3 below).23  
Figure 4.3. Sectoral Shares of Credit Extended to the Private Sector (per cent of totalO 
 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2016) 
Griffith-Jones and Karwowski (2013) emphasise that the much-vaunted relationship 
between financial sector development and growth crucially depends on whether financial 
sector deepening enables the financing of investment in productive assets through the 
extension of enterprise credit (rather than for instance feeding speculative bubbles through 
over-extension in real estate). The literature on financial sector development has also shown 
____________ 
22 World Bank (2017) reports that according to the Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 
(2016- 2017), in terms of the affordability of financial services index, Uganda ranks 120 out of 138 
countries, with a steady decline in its position over recent years. 
23 World Bank (2017: 35) adds that the bulk of agricultural credit is allocated to large-scale farmers. 
This implies that small- scale farmers, who collectively constitute more than 90 per cent of the 
agricultural system, have limited access to credit. 
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that while there is a positive relationship between credit to firms and growth, there is no 
correlation between growth and household credit (see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2011). 
Furthermore, rapidly growing credit to households may cause instability, in the absence of 
adequate prudential regulation and supervision.  
Fourth, credit conditions in the Uganda economy have worsened remarkably since mid-
2015. This is reflected in Figure 4.4 below which highlights the deceleration of the year on 
year growth of credit allocated to different sectors between mid-2015 and end of 2016 (and 
illustrated in the downturn in private sector credit extended by the banks as share of GDP in 
Figure 4.1 above). It bears repeating that this is despite the relative loosening of tight 
monetary policy conditions (see above). 
Figure 4.4. Year-on-year growth in credit allocation across sectors 
 
Source: World Bank (2017:8) 
Fifth, the above picture of costly and inadequate credit extension by banks to the private 
sector needs to be complemented with the observation that the Ugandan banking sector has 
held a significant share of its assets in the form of government securities. These represent on 
average around 20 per cent of bank assets which is a higher proportion than in neighbouring 
countries like Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania (World Bank 2017).24 This compares to a 
share of gross loans in total assets of just over 40 per cent (June 2016, see Bank of Uganda 
(2017: Table 3). While such a portfolio does not necessarily imply inefficiencies in credit 
allocations if government borrowing is deployed to finance investments with high social 
returns, such an outcome depends, on the one hand, on whether government securities 
support fiscal rather than monetary operations and, on the other, if the securities support 
fiscal operations, on the nature of these fiscal operations. Furthermore, interest payments to 
the financial sector raise distributional issues as interest payments have rapidly increased in 
the national budget over the last few years (see Figure 4.5).25 For the last two years, interest 
rates (on both domestic and foreign debt) have taken up in excess of 10 per cent of total 
____________ 
24 During the year to June 2016, further, banks increased their holdings of government securities by 
15.9 per cent up from 6.1 per cent while lending grew by 3.7 per cent compared to 19.7 per cent, 
reflecting a shift from riskier assets to safer assets (Bank of Uganda 2016: 16). 
25 This is perhaps even more significant when the tax base is mobilised to pay large amounts of interest 
payments to foreign banks (see below). 
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government expenditure, with the bulk of this accounted for by interest payments on 
domestic debt (see Government of Uganda 2017 Table 4.8).26  
Figure 4.5. Domestic interest rate payments in current UGX Billion 
 
Source: Government of Uganda (2017: 42). 
Finally, the banking sector has suffered from a dramatic increase in non-performing 
loans over the last few years. Between June 2015 and June 2016, the share of non-performing 
loans (NPLs) in total loans increased from 4 to 8.3 per cent(Bank of Uganda 2016). The 
EDA data collection period (November 2016-April 2017, see Bargawi and Van 
Waeyenberge 2018) took place as another domestic banking crisis unfolded with the Bank 
of Uganda’s take-over of Crane Bank (on 20th of October 2016). Crane had been Uganda’s 
fastest growing commercial bank and had won the “bank of the year” award for 10 times in 
its 20-year existence (MUBS Economic Forum November 2016). The Bank of Uganda 
takeover was motivated by the systemic risk Crane Bank presented to the Ugandan financial 
system as Crane was one of the systemically important institutions of the Ugandan banking 
system with 46 branches and almost 500,000 accounts (World Bank 2017: 22). Its ratio of 
NPLs to total loans had reached 23 per cent prior to its takeover. This latest intervention by 
the Bank of Uganda follows a series of recent commercial bank closures (National Bank of 
Commerce in 2012, the Global Trust Bank Uganda Limited in 2014, Imperial Bank in 
2015).27  
____________ 
26 The exact shares are as follows: for 2015/17, interest payments accounted for 10 per cent of total 
expenditure (and 8.7 per cent of total expenditure was for interest payments on domestic debt); for 
2016/17, interest payments accounted for 13.6 per cent of total government expenditure (and 11.3 per 
cent of total expenditure was for interest payments on domestic debt). Note that we refer to “domestic 
debt” on the basis of the currency denomination of the debt. This does not, however, give indications 
of ownership of the debt (foreign versus domestic). Further, in light of the stark increase in interest 
rate payments, Government of Uganda (2017: 41) indicates that the government will seek to reduce 
its borrowing from the domestic market to reduce interest rate costs. 
27 The takeover of failing banks by the Bank of Uganda needs to be situated in the context of 
successive recapitalisations of the Bank of Uganda (in 2012/13 for UGX 410 billion, in 2014/15 for 
UGX 150 billion, and in 2016/17 for a projected UGX 100 billion). The original request for the 
2014/15 recapitalisation had been for UGX 200 billion but this failed to be approved by Parliament, 
which approved UGX 150 billion instead. It was argued that “the request to capitalize Bank of Uganda 
comes at a time when then Country is faced with numerous unfunded and underfunded priorities 
amidst a constrained resource envelope and the justification for this proposed recapitalization was 
wanting” (Parliament of Uganda 2015: 83). 
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Figure 4.10: Domestic Interest Payments, UGX Billion
Source: MFPED
4.3.4 Overall Fiscal Performance in FY 2016/17
In order to support the scaling-up of public infrastructure investment, Government pursued an 
expansionary fisc al  policy stance with the budget defici t projected to be 3.6 percent of GDP in the 
Financial Year 2016/17. This is, however less than the planned fisc al  defici t of 6.6 percent at the start 
of the Financial Year.  Expenditure and net lending is therefore projected to amount to 19 percent 
of GDP at the end of the fina nci al  year compared to 22.4 percent of GDP at the start of the fina nci al  
year.  This performance is largely attributed to the under performance of the externally fina nced 
development budget. Table 4.7 shows selected fisc al  operations indicators for the current fina nci al  
year compared to previous years. 
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In January 2017 Crane Bank was sold to DFCU Bank Ltd, a foreign-owned concern 
with leading shareholders including Rabobank, the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation and Norfinance. The Global Trust Bank had equally been sold to DFCU in 2014 
and the assets of the National Bank of Commerce had been taken over by Crane Bank and 
had with the latest sale equally come under the control of DFCU. With the sale of Crane 
Bank to DFCU, the entire banking sector of Uganda became foreign-owned, with the 
exception of the Centenary Rural Development Bank, the Finance Trust Bank and the 
Housing Finance Bank. This sequence of events and its particular outcome in terms of 
foreign ownership are, however, not exceptional. Indeed, Stein (Stein 2010 260) observes 
how:  
The rapid foreign takeover of banking assets where the World Bank and the IMF dominated 
policy formation is no coincidence. In many countries the World Bank- and IMF-sponsored 
financial liberalisation had emphasised privatisation to domestic banks and led to financial 
crises. Following these crises banks were either sold off to foreign owners or new licenses were 
issued to foreign banks.  
Despite traditional arguments promoted by the World Bank (see e.g. Clarke, Cull et al. 
2001) that foreign bank entry improves financing conditions (of both quantity and terms), 
even if with a bias for larger enterprises, Dos Santos (2011: 200) observes how “foreign 
banks [have] proved to lend less to small and medium enterprises than domestic banks”. 
Stein (Stein 2010: 265) points to evidence that “the growing presence of foreign banks was 
overwhelmingly associated with lower overall growth and share of lending to the smaller 
businesses”.  At the same time, foreign banks tend to lead the way “in a boom of lending to 
households for consumption and mortgages”. Dos Santos (2011: 200) adds that IMF’s 
(2006) Global Financial Stability Report had already explicitly noted “that the rapid growth 
in credit to households in developing countries significantly followed from the increased 
presence of retail-lending-oriented foreign banks, which operate with ‘well-developed 
consumer-lending strategies’ (pp. 46–8)”. Such orientations are to the detriment of credit for 
productive investment and strongly characterise Ugandan credit extension, as was 
documented above.28  
Foreign banks also tend to rely on cross-border borrowing for funding their activities 
which leads them to promote foreign-currency denominated loans. The increased prevalence 
of foreign-currency denominated loans in credit extension in Uganda has indeed worsened 
financial vulnerabilities with an accumulation of currency risk by often unhedged 
borrowers.29 Reflecting these general trends, an important aspect of the credit risk implied 
in the rising share of NPLs referred to above has been the rising exposure of commercial 
banks to the real estate sector, which accounted for 25 per cent of total loans in 2016 (Bank 
of Uganda 2016: 34). This includes the risk that ensued from the increased practice by 
commercial banks to encourage their clients to contract foreign currency denominated real 
estate loans especially for commercial real estate and land purchases. This allegedly was to 
hedge against rising interest rates on shilling loans, but clearly increased the likelihood of 
____________ 
28 Stein (2010: 267) refers to a World Bank study which highlighted that following the sale of the 
Ugandan Commercial Bank to Stanbic (a South-African bank), credit growth slowed, the share of 
lending to manufacturing collapsed and holdings of government securities rapidly increased to 50 per 
cent of total assets. 
29 Foreign currency denominated assets in Uganda have seen an upward trend as a share of total assets, 
and in June 2016 accounted for 35 per cent, the highest such share for the EAC (compared to 16.4 per 
cent for Kenya, 32 per cent for Tanzania, 16.8 per cent for Rwanda, and 14.5 per cent for Burundi) 
(Bank of Uganda 2016: 40 Table 1). 
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default risk in the event of exchange rate depreciation (ibid.).30 Capturing these trends across 
different countries, Stein (Stein 2010: 256-6) sums up as follows:  
in a world of open capital accounts foreign banks have little appetite for the risks of developing 
countries. Instead, entry into developing countries becomes part of a global strategy of private 
maximisation, which is rather an anathema to the development process. Beyond servicing 
government debt needs, large frequently resource based multinationals and wealthy local elite, 
multinational banks are interested in moving funds out of developing countries as part of their 
global strategies of profit maximisation and accumulation. In this world small depositors and 
local SMEs in developing countries are mere nuisances of little consequence to these strategies. 
In this regard, the World Bank and IMF have been instrumental in increasing multinational bank 
access to developing country markets while demobilising the mechanisms of constraint at the 
national level that might impede their global accumulation strategies.  
Bategeka and Okumu (2010: 39) transpose this for the specific context of Uganda:  
liberalization of the banking sector in Uganda has led to limited competition in the sector. 
Commercial bank lending interest rates have remained persistently high … the drive for 
soundness of the banking sector in Uganda has been achieved at the cost of surrendering the key 
tenets for which liberalization of the banking sector was fronted i.e. competition and reduced 
investment costs. Access to financial services especially in rural areas remains a daunting 
challenge, with microfinance institutions offering financial services that not only hardly meet 
the needs of the rural dwellers, but also at very high cost in terms of high nominal interest rates 
and other transaction costs.  
In sum, despite being celebrated by the International Financial Institutions as the main 
vehicle through which credit will be extended in the service of the structural transformation 
of the country(see International Monetary Fund 2017; World Bank 2017 for recent 
statements), the Ugandan financial sector remains characterised by a set of fundamental 
weaknesses. Oqubay’s (2015: 56) argument that the abandonment by many African 
countries of industrial policies in combination with the opening of their financial markets 
has weakened domestic capital’s capacity to expand the productive base across African 
economies (see above), rings particularly true for the Ugandan case. 
While the Ugandan financial sector is fully liberalised and closely integrated 
internationally (its banks are now almost entirely foreign-owned), it is extending insufficient 
credit at too high a cost. Its lending portfolio is skewed away from the sectors necessitating 
credit to finance investment for the rapid expansion of gainful employment. As such, the 
financial sector is failing to perform the role that is commonly ascribed it.31 Financial sector 
liberalisation has not produced private investment in productive capacity to the extent that 
is needed for the Ugandan economy to absorb its fast-growing labour force into productive 
employment. High cost of credit prevails combined with a skewed allocation of credit away 
from sectors that need to access to credit both to finance working capital and to increase 
productive capacity.  
 
____________ 
30 The 2016 Financial Stability Report (Bank of Uganda 2016: 35) observes that: “anecdotal 
information obtained by BOU indicated that some commercial banks had encouraged their clients to 
contract foreign currency denominated real estate loans especially for commercial real estate and land 
purchase, to hedge against rising interest rates on shilling loans. This increases the likelihood of 
default risk in the event of exchange rate depreciation”. 
31 Note that initiatives that foster financial inclusion, such as for instance through the National 
Financial Inclusion Strategy, are unlikely to overcome the structural deficiencies emanating from the 
financial sector, including in its biased allocation of credit towards sectors that are unlikely to generate 
fast accelerations in productive employment as well as in the high cost of its credit extension. 
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The orthodox policy framework that promotes financial sector liberalisation has been 
accompanied by particular macro-imperatives. These macro-imperatives have interacted 
negatively with the particular features of the financial sector laid out above. Indeed, 
macroeconomic policy has been overwhelmingly geared towards macroeconomic stability 
which has been narrowly understood in terms of price stability (through inflation targeting). 
Concretely, the agenda of macroeconomic stability translates into the following specific 
imperatives: 
1. To achieve and maintain a real rate of growth of at least 6 per cent per annum. 
2. To maintain annual core inflation “close to BOU’s 5 per cent target and annual 
headline inflation within single digits”.  
3. Monetary and economic convergence and compatibility within the EAC 
(Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development 2016: 6).32 
Fiscal priorities have been enshrined in the Public Finance Management Act (2015) 
which instituted a Charter of Fiscal Responsibilities to govern the reporting requirements of 
the Government to Parliament. Through the Charter of Fiscal Responsibilities, the 
Government pledges to two measurable objectives for fiscal responsibility: 1) the 
government’s fiscal deficit (including grants) to be no greater than three per cent by 2020/21; 
and 2) public debt to remain below 50 per cent of GDP (with the net present value of external 
debt to be maintained below 30 per cent and the net present value of domestic debt to remain 
below 20 per cent) (MOFPED 2016: 6). The economic logic inspiring the three per cent limit 
on the deficit remains elusive while the consequent trends towards fiscal consolidation has 
significant (negative) implications for the fiscal space of the government. These have been 
particularly strong for the public investment programme that the government has embarked 
upon since NDPI. Indeed, public investment levels remain low (see Section 3) and the budget 
for public investment over the last few years has systematically been larger than the actual 
outturn (see Figure 4.6). 
Figure 4.6. Development spending (as share of GDP), budget (planned) versus outturn (executed) 
 
Source: IMF (2017: 33) 
____________ 
32 The EAC convergence criteria for monetary and fiscal policy targets are as follows: 1) a ceiling on 
headline inflation of eight per cent; 2) a ceiling on fiscal deficit (including grants) of 3 per cent of 
GDP; 3) a ceiling on gross public debt of 50 per cent in net present value terms; 4) reserves cover of 
4.5 months of imports (Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development 2016) 
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While the discrepancy between the budgeted and actual capital expenditure may reflect 
difficulties in executing the public investment programme, it equally captures a reluctance 
to incur fiscal deficits beyond the limits adopted through the EAC criteria. Figure 4.7 below 
illustrates recent trends in the fiscal deficit. This indicates that the recent increase in the 
deficit is entirely driven by the recapitalization of the BOU and the Hydropower projects 
(Karuma and Isimba), with the latter financed through external debt. Beyond that, the trend 
to consolidate the fiscal deficit below three per cent is strong and acts as a constraint on the 
mobilisation of resources for public investment. 
Figure 4.7. Fiscal deficit (as share of GDP), FY2012/13 – FY2016/17 
 
Van Waeyenberge and Bargawi (2010) undertake a comprehensive assessment of the 
implications of Uganda’s macro-economic policies for the scope to increase opportunities 
for decent work. We argue that tight monetary and fiscal policies, a flexible exchange rate, 
an open capital account, combined with extensive deregulation and privatisation efforts have 
hampered improvements in labour market outcomes as they have limited the scope to 
increase productive employment. We, further, assert that while the NDPI signified a 
welcome re-orientation towards policy issues of a longer-term nature and projected an 
ambitious reorientation of the country’s development strategy (with significant implications 
for job creation), closer inspection of the Plan and its interactions with the government’s 
Medium Term Expenditure Framework revealed the constraints imposed by the latter. In 
effect, budgetary projections through successive National Budget Frameworks persistently 
fell short of fiscal projections for the NDPI (see Van Waeyenberge and Bargawi 2010).33   
The macroeconomic strategy for the NDPII, in turn, has remained “underpinned by the 
objective of maintaining macro-economic stability”, while it seeks at the same time to 
mobilise resources needed to address the various infrastructural priorities identified in the 
____________ 
33 For 2014/2015 for instance, the projected budget was 17 per cent below the NDP projection 
(MOFPED 2014: 6).  
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NDPII (Government of Uganda 2015b: xxiv). As such, it seeks to combine macro-economic 
stability with the necessary fiscal expansion for infrastructure investments. The imperative 
of macro-economic stability, however dominates the need to increase public investment. 
This is nicely captured in the following extract from the Second Development Plan  
(Government of Uganda 2015: 103):  
To realise the necessary public investment, government will harness concessional and semi-
concessional financing and other development support facilities that are targeted to accelerate 
investment in infrastructure and human development, among other. However, government will 
be mindful of the need to maintain macroeconomic stability. 
Yet, it has probably been overstated in the literature that “(c)ountries that seek to 
expand employment opportunities must adopt macroeconomic frameworks that avoid 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies during periods of poor growth since they tend to 
reduce the growth of domestic demand, which affects employment generation” (UNRISD 
2010: 1).  
In the Ugandan context, while efforts have been made to increase resources available 
for public investment, this remains insufficient. Figure 4.8 compares total public 
expenditures as a share of GDP across the neighbouring countries and highlights that while 
public expenditure has increased recently in Uganda, it remains well below regional 
expenditure patterns. Moreover, public investment rates (as share of GDP), after a temporary 
increase, are projected to remain low hovering around six per cent of GDP over the period 
of the NDPII (2015/16-2019/20 (see Government of Uganda 2015: Table 5.1).  
Figure 4.8. Public expenditures as share of GDP (Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016: 27) 
The tendency towards fiscal consolidation reflects the imperative of inflation control 
as the main expression of the search for macro-economic stability. This is despite inflation 
Expansionary f scal policies are not necessarily ill-
advised or unjusti f able. It is an established principle of 
economic theory that def cit-f nanced public investment 
projects can be justif ed as a corrective response, acting both 
as a c untercyclical stimulus and potentially enhancing the 
stock of public assets, which in turn serves to stimulate the 
private sector and thus facilitate the achievement of long-
term economic growth. However, to appropriately assess 
and provide recomme dations for the Government ’s f scal 
policy, this Economic Update discusses how the Government is 
spending its resources, on what, and if this expenditure is resulting 
in the creation of the intended economic value.
3.1  Fisc a l  s t r at eg y  a l mo st  c o n sis t en t  
w it h  n at io n a l  d ev el o pmen t  pr io r it ies 
Recent f scal expansion in Uganda is largely the result 
of signif cant increases in expenditure to implement 
an ambitious public investment program, without 
corresponding increases in terms of revenue collection. 
Over the period from FY 2008/09 to FY 2014/15, the value of 
total expenditures increased from 15.0 percent of GDP to 19.4 
percent. Uganda’s average annual expenditure amounted to 
a value of 17.4 perc nt of GDP over this period, which was at 
least 10 percentage points lower than that of any of its regional 
peers, with Kenya’s average expenditure standing at 29 percent; 
Rwanda’s at 28 percent; and Tanza i ’s t 27 percent (see 
Figure 12). However, over the same period, the average annual 
value of Uganda’s collected revenues amounted to only 11.8 
percent of GDP, which resulted in the rapid increase in the f scal 
def cit. As discussed in Chapter 2, Uganda plans to increase its 
expenditure to supp rt a huge public investment program that 
is intended to address the country’s signif cant infrastructure 
def cit and to build production facilities to enable exploiting 
the country’s il resourc . Under this cen rio, Uganda may 
catch up with and even surpass its regional peers before the 
requirement to limit f scal expenditures, which is part of the 
EAC convergency criteria, is impl mented. 
Figure 12: Uganda lags regional peers in level of public expenditure 
Source: IMF
Jinja Road the major 
gateway to and from 
Kampala City to the East
Uganda plans 
to increase its 
expenditure to 
support a huge 
public investment 
program to address 
the country’s 
infrastructure 
def cit and to build 
production facilities 
to enable it exploit 
its oil resource
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in Uganda having remained within single-digits over a sustained period of time.34 
Furthermore, such a stance reflects an erroneous understanding of the relationship, on the 
one hand, between a fiscal deficit and inflation,35 and on the other, inflation and growth. 
With regard to the latter, across a contested academic and policy literature, no consensus 
exists on what “safe” inflation thresholds are in developing countries. Following Ortiz et 
al.’s (2017) summary of a wide spectrum of views across academic and IMF contributions 
on what constitutes an “acceptable level of inflation”, its value varies between 3 and 40 per 
cent (see Table 4.1) Ortiz et al. (2017: 51) conclude that: “inflation thresholds are arbitrary 
policy choices based on particular conditions in different societies, and monetary policies 
should be designed to encourage employment creation”.  
Table 4.1. Results of survey of literature on “safe” inflation thresholds for developing countries 
 Author(s) Inflation threshold (%) 
Academic papers 
 
Fischer (1993) 15-30 
Bruno (1995) 20 
Barro (1996) 10—20 
Bruno and Easterly (1998) 40 
Gylfason and Herbertsson (2001) 10-20 
Rousseau and Watchel (2002) 13-25 
Burdekin et al. (2004) 3 
Gillman et al. (2004) 10 
Sepehri and Moshiri (2004) 5-15 
Pollin and Zhu (2006) 14-16 
Li (2006) 14 
Vaona and Schiavo (2007) 12 
US GAO (2009) 5-12 
Bick (2010) 12 
Kremer et al. (2011) 17 
IMF papers 
Sarel (1996) 8 
Ghosh and Phillips (1998) >5 
Kochar and Coorey (1999) 5 
Khan and Senhadji (2001) 11-12 
Selassie et al. (2006) 5 
Espinoza et al. (2010) 10 
Blanchard et al. (2010) 4 
Source: Ortiz et al. (2017: 50) 
 
____________ 
34 The exceptions are short episodes (in 2008 and 2011) when inflation increases were mainly driven 
by increases in food and fuel prices. 
35 Van Waeyenberge and Bargawi (2010: 31) dispel this myth with reference to(2010: 15): “Uganda 
is unlikely to register higher inflation just because of a wider fiscal deficit, mainly for the following 
two reasons: 1) High demand for imported inputs for the development of public infrastructure; some 
of the inputs could be sourced from abroad with little impact on monetary expansion in the domestic 
economy … 2) The Ugandan economic is operating at below full employment, calling for a stimulus 
package to increase resource allocation and utilisation, employment and capacity utilisation”.  
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Nevertheless, in Uganda, a strict inflation-targeting regime has taken prevalence over 
fiscal needs (with significant repercussions for the fiscal resources available to finance 
public investment). Ndikumana (2017) provides a recent account for sub-Saharan Africa of 
the costs in terms of reduced investment that result from the pursuit of inflation control 
through monetary policy. Econometric evidence drawing on a sample of 37 sub-Saharan 
African countries over the period 1980-2012 demonstrates how “contractionary monetary 
policy affects domestic investment negatively both indirectly through the bank lending or 
quantity channel as well as directly through the interest rate or cost of capital channel” (p. 1). 
Referring to the observations regarding the financial sector above, Ndikumana (2017) 
highlights that: 
In the case of SSA countries, policies that seek to restrict domestic credit as a means of 
containing domestic demand and inflation ultimately exacerbate the negative effects of the 
already pervasive credit rationing by banks. Lack of competition in African banking systems 
keeps borrowing costs high. In addition, banks tend to lend to sectors that are deemed safe, 
notably large trading companies. Banks have little incentives to expand their customer base as 
long as they are able to maintain high profit rates while minimizing exposure to risk.  
Credit contractions have significant effects on the supply side of the economy as they 
negatively affect the ability of firms to invest and hire labour. As such, “credit contraction 
causes a decline in capacity utilization, employment, and production. Tight monetary policy, 
which is usually associated with high interest rates and a strong currency, particularly hurts 
export-oriented sectors by undermining international competitiveness” (p. 5).  
In sum, the discussion in this section has sought to draw out some tensions and 
contradictions that underlie the Ugandan government’s reliance on the private sector to 
spearhead a rapid upscaling of productive capacity. It highlighted the inadequacies of a 
strategy that relies on the private banking sector to finance investments against the backdrop 
of an orthodox macroeconomic policy stance which circumscribes the capacity of the state 
to engage in large-scale investment programmes. Bargawi and Van Waeyenberge (2018) 
further document how the realities bearing on the scope to finance development have 
negatively combined with the fragmented and ad-hoc character of policy-making. In general, 
the combination of a market-led paradigm with an orthodox macro framework produces a 
set of negative micro-realities in terms of how government expenditures are allocated within 
a particular resource envelope, including in terms of the specific activity funded, the 
particular actors favoured and the general conditions under which interventions take place. 
These include the demand-led nature of agricultural interventions, the absence of 
performance criteria in industrial policy, the absence of a strategic directive framework with 
regard to FDI, the absence of tariffs to support export promotion, etc. 
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5. Policy Recommendations 
Policies aimed at supporting “decent work for all” in Uganda need to look beyond the 
labour market and to address the nature and potential deficiencies of growth and structural 
change in the economy. This requires close consideration of how and why structural 
impediments persist, including a rethinking of Uganda’s macroeconomic framework and for 
the latter to place structural transformation and the associated employment challenge at its 
centre.  
Van Waeyenberge and Bargawi (2010) emphasise that the macro-framework 
determines (and constrains) the scope for large upscaling in an economy. To bring about a 
growth path that generates fast accelerations in productive employment, a macroeconomic 
policy stance is necessary that puts public investment at its centre and this needs to be 
accompanied by focused sectoral policies that seek to ensure that increased investment 
translates into changes in patterns of employment towards higher productivity activities and 
labour market policies that support decent work and pay. In essence, this involves a more 
strategic deployment of macro-economic policy in support of growth, structural 
transformation and the creation of gainful employment and for this to be accompanied by a 
broader set of interventions, including to support labour market institutions, such as the 
introduction of a minimum wage, fostering basic and vocational skills and training 
opportunities, and the development and implementation of a comprehensive industrial 
policy. 
In relation to fiscal policy, there is an urgent need to rethink the conservative approach 
to public investment. The Ugandan economy is operating below capacity with ample scope 
to increase public spending, particularly in areas that would crowd-in further private 
investment. This includes both physical infrastructure investments but also much needed 
investments in social infrastructure, including through increased spending on health and 
education that would create much-needed skilled employment for both men and women. The 
basic rationale for running public deficits to finance public investment is that the future rate 
of return on such investment would pay off the debt.  
The acceleration of public spending needs to be complemented with improved efforts 
to mobilise domestic revenue. Ortiz et al. (2017) suggest a broader spectrum of ways in 
which fiscal space can be fostered. This has become all the more urgent in Uganda as 
overseas development assistance flows from traditional donors have stalled since the Global 
Financial Crisis. Mawejje and Munyambonera (2017) outline a number of ways in which 
(domestic and external) resource mobilisation can be improved for Uganda, including 
curtailing capital flight and leveraging non-tax revenue contributions. Turning to new and 
emerging donors, including China, India, South Korea and Turkey may also offer further 
opportunities to raise new sources of external finance.  
With regard to monetary policy, there is an urgent  need to rethink its role beyond 
inflation-targeting. Epstein (2013: 283) calls for “developmental central banking” that “can 
enhance coordination with broader governmental macroeconomic and developmental 
policy” and goes on to highlight how various countries have successfully adopted such a 
strategy. In the context of Uganda’s development and job-creation objectives, as outlined in 
NDP II (Government of Uganda 2015), monetary policy must therefore accommodate two 
complementary objectives. The first is to increase overall public and private investment; and 
the second is to direct such investment strategically to sectors and firms that can generate  
much-needed jobs. These objectives could be implemented by extending subsidised credit 
to strategic industries and firms as well as by including job-generation clauses in loans to 
the private sector. Recent discussions in Uganda have focused on strengthening the role of 
the Uganda Development Bank (UDB) in this regard. However, it is insufficient to increase 
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credit extension through the UDB without a clear framework that guides such credit 
extension to strategic sectors and that includes performance requirements in return for access 
to subsidised credit. Macroeconomic policy, once again, needs to be devised in support of 
(rather than acting as constraint on) the broader strategic objective of structural 
transformation to effect much-needed increases in decent work. 
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6. Conclusion 
This Working Paper argues that the macroeconomic policy agenda continues to restrict 
the scope for a fundamental transformation of the Ugandan economy necessary to support 
much-needed job creation and increases in the standard of living. It draws on background 
research conducted as part of an EDA for Uganda (see Bargawi and Van Waeyenberge 2018) 
and raises the following issues.  
First, despite progress in relation to poverty reduction in the past, the creation of decent 
jobs for the rapidly expanding working-age population of Uganda remains inadequate. The 
labour market remains characterised by very high rates of informality, under-employment 
and low and stagnant wages. New and existing labour market participants work in low-
productivity activities in either agriculture or services trade. Second, labour market 
outcomes in Uganda are strongly linked to the nature of the country’s growth since the mid-
1990s. Specifically, the insufficient structural transformation of the Ugandan economy has 
restricted the demand for decent jobs in high(er)-productivity growth sectors. Third, the 
Ugandan authorities’ have signalled increasing awareness of the need to tackle the 
employment challenge, most recently through the second National Development Plan 
(NDP II) (Government of Uganda 2015), which recognises the urgent need for decent jobs. 
However, despite such recognition, policy initiatives have suffered from major draw-
backs. The focus here was on a disjuncture between the Ugandan government’s policy 
proposals to accelerate growth and create jobs, and the actual, historical experience of 
capitalist development. Indeed, across different government initiatives, a contradiction 
recurs between, on the one hand, the government’s celebration of the private sector as the 
most important agent to bring about growth and structural transformation, and, on the other 
hand, a failure to appreciate (and cater for) the specific needs of the private sector, (beyond 
those of the financial sector). This transpires from the way in which short-term macro–
financial priorities have dominated longer-term imperatives of growth and structural 
transformation. This has direct effects in terms of levels and allocation of public investment. 
It has indirect effects on private sector investment, resulting from the inadequate availability 
of credit, high cost of capital, insufficient domestic demand resulting from insufficient 
crowding in through public investment and low productivity and hence purchasing power 
across the economy.  
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